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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of money in markets where financial investment
takes place in a decentralized fashion. A key methodological contribution is the
development of a dynamic framework that brings together a model for illiquid
financial assets a` la Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, and a monetary framework a`
la Lagos andWright. The presence of decentralized financial markets generates an
essential role for money in helping investors re-balance their portfolios. From the
equilibrium conditions we are able to derive an asset pricing theory that delivers
an explicit connection between monetary policy, the different asset prices, and
welfare. In contrast to the existing monetary literature, we can sustain welfare
gains even with positive inflation rates. Also, we obtain a negative relationship
between inflation and asset prices, that are always above their fundamental value.
This price differential is associated with a liquidity premium.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades secondary financial markets have developed considerably,
both in size and complexity. New financial products are generated through processes
of securitization by which financial assets are derived from the value of an underlying
asset. In their seminal paper Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) document that
many of these financial products are traded in markets that are characterized by
search frictions. At the same time, since the influential work of Lagos and Wright
(2005) monetary search models have been integrated into main-stream macroeconomic
theory. Their model analyzes the role of monetary exchange in economies where trade
is not centralized through some perfect and frictionless (Walrasian) market.
Our paper attempts to bring these two strands of the literature together by study-
ing the role that money can play, through liquidity provision, in frictional financial
markets. Duffie et al. analyze Over-the-Counter markets where financial assets trade
without the use of a liquid asset like fiat money. On the other hand Lagos and Wright
(2005) consider a model where money helps overcome certain frictions of decentralized
trade. However, agents here trade consumption goods for the liquid asset. Our objec-
tive is to bring the framework in Duffie et al. (2005) into a dynamic monetary model
where financial markets with frictions may generate a role for money.1 We present a
model with a sequence of markets where agents can store a safe-return real asset and
later on convert part of it into a risky and illiquid financial investment. The modeling
of this risky asset follows Duffie et al.: it yields different idiosyncratic returns and
agents can re-balance their portfolios in illiquid (decentralized) markets. A relevant
innovative element in our approach is that investors can (and will) use money as a
medium of exchange for those transactions. We show that money is not neutral and
has an impact on both the volume of trade and the value of assets.
Duffie et al. consider the specific trading structure in decentralized financial mar-
kets where assets are traded by procedures like bid-ask pricing, bilateral or multi-
lateral bargaining, etc. They build a model that rationalizes standard measures of
liquidity in these markets such as trade volume, bid-ask spreads, and trading delays.
However, investors’ ability to re-balance their positions is severely limited by the re-
striction that agents can hold either 0 units or 1 unit of the assets. On the other
hand, the search-theoretic literature stemming from Lagos and Wright (2005) devel-
ops a framework where centralized and decentralized markets interact. We consider
this an appropriate setup for analyzing these issues that has not been exploited in our
direction.
1 As it is well known, in models that feature Arrow-Debreu type of markets it is very hard to
support monetary equilibria other than those where agents are “forced” to hold money, e.g. money
in the utility function or cash-in-advance models.
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Lagos (2011) presents an asset pricing model where equity shares and fiat money
can be used as means of payment for consumption, and derives a monetary policy
scheme as a function of stochastic equity returns. In this model, however, there is
neither collateral nor trading of assets, just exchange of consumption goods for real
assets and fiat money. In a paper that more specifically tries to approach Over-the-
Counter markets in a less restrictive manner than Duffie et al., Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009) develop a framework where investors may wish to adjust their asset positions
after a shock to preferences that affect their asset demand. They may do so contacting
financial intermediaries that charge a fee. The authors try to explain the above
mentioned dimensions of liquidity in these markets. In a more recent paper, and
within a very similar setup, Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011) take a step further
and consider crises and recoveries in these markets. They define a crisis as a negative
shock to investors’ asset demand that will recover at a random time. Liquidity can
be provided by dealers, since they accumulate asset inventories. In the cases where
it is not optimal for the dealers to accumulate assets, the government can step in
and provide liquidity instead. Nevertheless, these models have neither fiat money nor
assets serving as collateral, and therefore their notions of liquidity differ somehow from
the standard ones. Ferraris and Watanabe (2011) model capital accumulation that
will serve as collateral, and discuss the effects of fluctuations in the liquidation value
of collateral on the economy’s allocation and its interaction with monetary policy. As
it turns out, however, we find that no relevant paper in this field has yet tried to
formally approach the integration of money in illiquid financial markets.
Thus, we want to build a model that fills the gap between the finance and mone-
tary literature. Our main contribution is the development of a framework that allows
us to derive an asset pricing theory that delivers an explicit connection between mon-
etary policy, the different asset prices, and welfare. We find that the value generated
in these markets is affected by monetary policy, and the equilibrium price of the un-
derlying asset is always above its fundamental value. In particular, two of our results
stand in contrast to those in most of the search literature. First, under certain pa-
rameterizations welfare gains can be sustained even by positive inflation rates. In the
related literature the optimal policy usually depicts deflationary money growth rates.
Second, our pricing equations reveal that the monetary policy instrument and the
price of the underlying asset are negatively correlated. The reason is that money and
the asset are complements in our model, as opposed to a majority of the literature
where they are substitutes. This aspect is further elaborated by Ferraris (2010) and
Geromichalos, Licari, and Sua´rez-Lledo´ (2007). We shall later discuss our results in
more detail.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present the
main features of the model and describe the market structures that will allow us to
study the role of the different assets, which is derived from the optimal behavior of
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each type of agent. In section 4 we proceed to analyze the existence of a monetary
equilibrium as well as the nature of asset prices and the welfare consequences of
inflation. Section 5 contains the main conclusions. In an Appendix we also consider
two alternative pricing protocols in the decentralized market to test the robustness of
the results.
2 The Model
The environment that we analyze takes the framework presented in Lagos and Wright
(2005), henceforth LW, as a starting point. Time is discrete and there is a [0, 1] con-
tinuum of agents that live forever and discount future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). There are
three assets in the model: a real asset that yields a deterministic return, R, at the
end of every period, a risky financial asset, and an intrinsically worthless object that
we call money. In every period agents engage in different activities in three markets
that open sequentially. At the beginning of a period, t, agents enter an investment
market (IM) with a certain amount of the real asset, at, and money holdings, mt,
that they have previously stored. In this first market agents can decide how much
of the safe asset to transform into a risky financial asset, st ∈ [0, at], thus giving up
any claim on the safe real return by the issued amount. Instead, investing in this
new asset will yield a high return, y
H
, or a low return, y
L
, at the end of the period
with equal probability. Furthermore, in order to make the analysis more interesting
we are going to assume that 0 ≤ y
L
< y
H
, and that y
H
> R. Following Duffie et al.,
we model idiosyncratic returns such that depending on the type of investor I turn out
to be I will obtain different return. However, this idiosyncratic uncertainty will only
be resolved right after the investment decisions have been made and before entering
a decentralized financial market (DFM). These returns are i.i.d. distributed across
periods and agents.
In the second market, having learned their types, agents can readjust their portfo-
lios by re-balancing their holdings of the risky asset. This process happens in bilateral
meetings where agents’ types are public info. In particular, gains from this decentral-
ized trade are generated a` la Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) from low-return agents
wanting to sell their investment assets to high-return agents. Anonymity, in the sense
that trading histories are not known among agents, is still present in this environment.
Also, there is imperfect enforcement and a double coincidence problem.2 These are
some of the main elements that render money essential in this type of framework, as
discussed in Kocherlakota (1998). In particular, we will show that money will allow
to reallocate otherwise inefficient investment allocations.
2 Only agents of different types will be willing to trade their risky assets: high types want to take
on larger investment amounts in assets that will give them higher returns than the safe asset; and
low types may want to get ride of low-yield investment.
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Finally, after the investment and the decentralized financial market everyone en-
ters a centralized market (CM) with their new holdings of the risky asset, the safe
asset, and money. At this last stage agents will choose how much of the safe real
asset and money they will carry onto the next period. They also derive net utility,
U(Xt)−Ht, from consuming an amount of a general good, Xt, and from supplying an
amount of labor, Ht. Notice that this is the only market in which agents consume and
work. Utility, U(Xt). is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with U
′ > 0,
U ′′ ≤ 0. We also assume there exists X∗ such that U ′(X∗) = 1, with U ′(X∗) > X∗.
At this stage, agents can acquire any quantity of money, mˆt, and the real asset, aˆt, for
the next period at prices φ and ψ, respectively. The supply of this asset is fixed, A,
and each unit yields dividend, R, in the last market of the next period. Money supply
is controlled by a monetary authority and it evolves according to Mˆt = (1 + µ)Mt.
This paper departs from LW and other related papers in two fundamental aspects
that will be discussed in detail below: one is the introduction of an investment market
for securitization, and the other relates to how we model decentralized financial trade.
As we mentioned in the introduction, this departure will generate very interesting re-
sults, also regarding monetary policy. Some stand in contrast to those in related
papers. Finally, it is an important issue in the literature that deals with decentral-
ized trade, and particularly in the money-search literature, how different bargaining
protocols may determine the terms of trade. A broad discussion on this is provided
by Rocheteau and Wright (2005). In our paper we consider both price taking and
bargaining.3 However, the structure that we endow decentralized trade with turns out
specially relevant. Indeed, we find that Arrow-Debreu equilibria where the price of
the real asset deviates from its fundamental value can only be supported under price
taking. Therefore, event though the bargaining version has some interesting aspects,
we relegate its analysis and the justification of this result to the Appendix. In order
to save notation, we drop the time subscripts from now on whenever it does not lead
to confusion.
3 Optimal Behavior
3.1 Centralized Market
In order to derive a more clear intuition of the mechanism of the model, and for
convenience of analysis, we proceed to solve the model backwards, starting from the
third sub-period, a Walrasian centralized market. The value function of entering the
3 Price taking can be regarded as the monetary version of Lucas and Prescott (1974).
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CM with money holdings m, real asset holdings b, and financial investment s is
V 3j(m, b, s) = max
mˆ,aˆ,X,H
{
U(X) −H + βV 1(mˆ, aˆ)
}
s.t. φmˆ+ ψaˆ+X = H + φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
j
)s,
where j = L,H, and b = a − s, with a being the amount of the real asset brought
from the previous period. Three observations are immediate. First, in every period
X = X∗ and we can write
V 3j(m, b, s) = U(X∗)−X∗ + φm+ (ψ +R)b+
(ψ + y
j
)s+max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+ βV 1(mˆ, aˆ)
}
. (1)
Second, V 3j is linear in all its arguments,
V 3j(m, b, s) = Λ + φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
j
)s, (2)
where the definition of Λ is obvious. Finally, it is easy to see from (1) that there are
not any wealth effects: the agent’s choices of mˆ, aˆ do not depend on today’s states
m,a. This is a consequence of quasi-linearity of preferences. Although we will discuss
the solution to the optimization problem above later, we lay out here the first order
conditions for mˆ and aˆ,
−φ+ βV 1m(mˆ, aˆ) ≤ 0 (= 0, if mˆ > 0), (3)
−ψ + βV 1a (mˆ, aˆ) ≤ 0 (= 0, if aˆ > 0), (4)
where V 1i stands for the partial derivative of V
1 with respect to its argument i. From
expression (2) the envelope conditions would be
V 3jm = φm; V
3j
b = ψ +R; V
3j
s = ψ + yj.
The first order conditions refer to the fact that the cost of carrying the assets across
periods must not be negative. Otherwise agents would want to accumulate unbounded
amounts of money and the real asset. In a pure Arrow-Debreu world the equilibrium
condition for the real asset would imply its price just reflecting the discounted flow of
returns. In our model its price will reflect the discounted marginal value of carrying
the asset into the next period, which will differ from its fundamental value.
3.2 Decentralized Financial Market
A large percentage of the financial sector is composed of markets for less liquid assets
that are more difficult to trade in regular centralized markets. Trade is carried out
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in more decentralized procedures in these markets. Over-the-Counter markets are a
especially relevant example (Duffie et al. (2005), Lagos et al. (2010)). However, it is
also the case that in many of these markets agents do not usually bargain. Instead,
they feature some type of price taking protocol (bid-ask pricing). Following the logic
of these type of markets, we model here the exchange of a risky financial asset, s,
that is less liquid than a standard real asset, a, commonly traded in a centralized
Walrasian market. We also consider a price taking mechanism that resembles those
in the kind of markets we are interested in.
When agents enter our DFM they know what return they will obtain for their
investment in the risky asset, and they are now allowed to re-balance their positions on
this investment by trading the risky asset. Since 0 < y
L
< y
H
, L-types will naturally
arise as the sellers of s, while the H-types will naturally become the buyers.4 Let p
be the dollar price of one unit of investment. Conditional on being an L-type, and
hence a seller, an agent who carries an amount s solves the following problem5
max
qs≤s
V 3L (m+ pqs, b, s− qs)
or alternatively
max
qs≤s
{Λ+ φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
L
)s + (φp − ψ − y
L
)qs} ,
where qs is the supply of securities. The seller’s optimal behavior yields the individual
supply function
q∗s =


0, if p <
ψ+y
L
φ ,
∈ [0, s], if p =
ψ+y
L
φ ,
s, if p >
ψ+y
L
φ .
In short, L-types will not sell if the price is low, they will be indifferent if the price
falls in a medium range, and would want to sell everything if the price exceeds the
value of the asset. Interestingly, notice that since the price of s is in nominal terms
and that of the real asset is in real terms, inflation will have something to say here.
Sellers compare p to the nominal value of ψ + y
L
by dividing it by φ. Therefore, as
4 In principle it makes sense that L-types want to get rid of a bad asset, while H-types want to
purchase more of an asset on which they can get a high return. As will be shown, the amount of money
exchanged in this market will be either such that L-types are at least indifferent, which will make
trade profitable for H-types, or such that H-types are indifferent, in which case trade will be profitable
for L-types. Therefore, the natural arrangement in this market is actually always implemented in
any equilibrium.
5 Given the competitive nature of this market, the only variables that matter for the seller’s
problem are s and the price (that she takes as given). Similarly, in the buyer’s problem below the
relevant variables are m,p.
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the real value of money, φ, increases it is more likely that p > (ψ + y
L
)/φ and they
will want to sell everything. Conversely, as inflation is higher, φ→ 0, sellers decrease
their supply, qs → 0.
Conditional on being an H-type, an agent solves
max
qb≤m/p
V 3H (m− pqb, b, s + qb)
or alternatively
max
qb≤m/p
{Λ+ φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
H
)s+ (ψ + y
H
− φp)qb} .
where qb is the demand of securities. The demand function is given by
q∗b =


0, if p >
ψ+y
H
φ ,
∈ [0,m/p], if p =
ψ+y
H
φ ,
m/p, if p <
ψ+y
H
φ .
The interpretation for buyers is the opposite as that for sellers, and inflation also
plays a role; as φ→ 0, buyers increase their demand, qb → m/p. Figure 1 depicts the
aggregate demand and supply curves. The equilibrium price and the quantity of s
that is traded depend on the shape of the demand curve. In particular, inspection of
the demand and supply functions shows that equilibrium depends on the distribution
of the returns on the financial asset. If φm < (ψ+ y
L
)s (represented by D1 in Figure
1), we have Q∗ = (λ/2)(φm)/(ψ + y
L
). If φm ≥ (ψ + y
L
)s (represented by D2 in
Figure 1), we have Q∗ = λs/2. Therefore, Q∗ = (λ/2)min {s, (φm)/(ψ + y
L
)}. The
parameter λ is the probability of going into the DFM. It can be seen as the degree of
access to decentralized financial markets. Thus, this parameter can also be interpreted
as a measure of the liquidity of these markets. The equilibrium quantity of s that a
representative agent (H-type) acquires in the DFM is then
q∗ = min
{
s,
φm
ψ + y
L
}
, (5)
and the equilibrium price is given by
p∗ =


ψ+y
L
φ , if φm < (ψ + yL)s,
m
s , if φm ∈ [(ψ + yL)s, (ψ + yH )s],
ψ+y
H
φ , ifφm > (ψ + yH )s .
(6)
Interestingly enough, the equilibrium in this market depends on real money balances,
φm. Portfolio re-balancing generates a role for money and takes place at the equilib-
rium price, p∗, which depends on inflation through φ. Moreover, it is key to notice
from equation (5) that trade in this market exists, q∗ > 0, if and only if φm > 0.
Therefore, the relationship between monetary equilibrium and financial trade is one-
to-one.
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3.3 Investment Market
At the beginning of every period, agents enter a financial market with holdings of
money and real asset from previous period. Thus, the vector of state variables is
(m,a), and the agent wishes to maximize her continuation value in the DFM by
choosing optimally what part of a to invest in the risky asset. Therefore, an agent
that enters the IM with portfolio (m,a) has a value function6
V 1(m,a) = max
s∈[0,a]
{
1
2
[
V 2L (m, b, s) + V 2H (m, b, s)
]}
. (7)
In order to examine the optimal choice of s for the agent, we need to replace the
value functions V 2j with more useful expressions. To that end notice that
V 2L (m, b, s) = λV 3L (m+ pqs, b, s− qs) + (1− λ)V
3L (m, b, s) ,
V 2H (m, b, s) = λV 3H (m− pqs, b, s + qs) + (1− λ)V
3H (m, b, s) .
Equivalently, using the results derived above regarding the terms of trade in the DFM
we can write
V 2L (m, b, s) = λV 3L (m+ p∗q∗, b, s− q∗) + (1− λ)V 3L (m, b, s) ,
V 2H (m, b, s) = λV 3H (m− p∗q∗, b, s+ q∗) + (1− λ)V 3H (m, b, s) .
Then, exploiting the linearity of V 3j , equation (2), and using (5), we obtain
1
2
[
V 2L (m, b, s) + V 2H (m, b, s)
]
= Λ+ φm+ (ψ +R)a+
+
[
1
2
(y
L
+ y
H
)−R
]
s+
λ
2
(y
H
− y
L
)min
{
s,
φm
ψ + y
L
}
. (8)
Inserting (8) into (7), we can rewrite the objective function as
maxs∈[0,a]
{ [
1
2 (yL + yH )−R
]
s+ λ2 (yH − yL)min
{
s, φmψ+y
L
}}
≡
≡ maxs∈[0,a]
{
α1s+ α2min {s, α3}
}
.
The definitions of the terms αi, i = 1, 2, 3, are obvious and are adopted for analytical
convenience. The objective function of the agent is very intuitive. The first term,
1
2(yL + yH )−R, represents that for every unit of a that she turns into s, she forgoes
the return R, and gains y
L
or y
H
with equal probability. The second term of the
objective is the expected gain from trade in the DFM, which is equal to the total
6 Since b = a− s it does not matter whether the agent chooses s or b.
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number of units of s that trade in the DFM multiplied by the average gain from this
transaction. For every unit of s that goes from the hands of an L-type to those of an
H-type, a surplus equal to y
H
− y
L
is generated.
Consider now the optimal choice of s, namely, s∗. In order to focus on the more
interesting situations we want to consider the case where the expected return from
the risky investment is less than the return on the safe asset, i.e. we assume that
α1 ≡ (1/2) (yL + yH )−R ≤ 0. This means that if agents were not able to trade s in
the DFM, they would never choose s∗ > 0.7 The objective of the agent is depicted in
Figure 2 for various parameter values. The key variable for the determination of s∗
is α1 + α2 = (1/2)[(1 + λ)yH + (1 − λ)yL ] − R. This term is the multiplier of s for
s ≤ α3. When the financial market is fairly liquid, λ big, more weight is put on yH
and α1 + α2 is also big. If financial markets are illiquid, λ = 0, the agent never gets
to trade into the DFM; the gain from holding s coincides with the net return of the
risky asset, which is assumed to be non-positive. If λ = 1, α1 + α2 = yH − R > 0.
The following Lemma summarizes the optimal investment policy.
Lemma 1. For a given state (m,a), the optimal choice of s ∈ [0, a] is given by
s∗ =


0, if α1 + α2 < 0,
∈ [0,min{α3, a}] , if α1 + α2 = 0,
min{α3, a}, if α1 + α2 > 0 and α1 < 0,
∈ [min{α3, a}, a] , if α1 + α2 > 0 and α1 = 0.
(9)
Proof. The result follows from inspection of the objective function and Figure 2.
The following lemma will be useful in later analysis and expresses that the net
gain of carrying assets across periods is non-positive. The interpretation behind this
is that agents will only be willing to carry assets, money and real asset, if there
are positive gains from re-balancing their investment positions in the DFM. Indeed,
we show below that one of the main contributions of the model is that the value
generated by this mechanism is reflected in the asset pricing equation. Should this
gain not exist, only the fundamental value of the asset would be reflected by its price,
i.e. the discounted flow of expected returns.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium
ψ ≥ β
(
R+ ψˆ
)
,
φ ≥ βφˆ.
7 Alternatively, the assumption that α1 ≤ 0 shows the robustness of the results in our model: if
agents choose s∗ > 0 when the net return (excluding the potential gains in the DFM) of the risky
asset is non-positive, then they will definitely do so if α1 were positive.
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Proof. This is a standard result in the literature and its proof is omitted. For details
see for example Geromichalos, Licari, and Sua´rez-Lledo´ (2007).
Having characterized the optimal choice of s we can proceed to analyze the choice
of mˆ, aˆ by examining the value function V 3j . This choice will crucially depend on the
parameter values. Once again the key determinant is the term α1 + α2.
Case 1: α1 + α2 < 0. We know that in the next period the agent will choose
to not invest anything in the risky asset, i.e. sˆ∗ = 0 and q∗ = 0. Hence, we can write8
V 3j(m, b, s) = U(X∗)−X∗ + φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
j
)s
+max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+
β
2
[
V 2L(mˆ+ µM, aˆ, 0) + V 2H(mˆ+ µM, aˆ, 0)
]}
=
= Ω1 +max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+ β
[
Λˆ + φˆ(mˆ+ µM) + (R+ ψˆ)aˆ
+
λ
2
(y
H
− y
L
)min
{
0,
φˆ(mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}]}
=
= Ω2 +max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−
(
φ− βφˆ
)
mˆ−
[
ψ − β
(
R+ ψˆ
)]
aˆ
}
,
where the first equality follows from (8) and the definition of q∗. The terms Ω1, Ω2,
and Λˆ do not depend on mˆ, aˆ, and their definitions are obvious.9 Recall from Lemma
2 that the multipliers of both mˆ and aˆ above are non positive. Hence, it is easy to
see that the optimal choices of these variables satisfy
mˆ∗ =
{
0, if φ > βφˆ,
∈ ℜ+, if φ = βφˆ,
aˆ∗ =


0, if ψ > β
(
R+ ψˆ
)
,
∈ ℜ+, if ψ = β
(
R+ ψˆ
)
.
(10)
We will return to describe equilibrium in this case. Before that, we complete our
description of the optimal choice of mˆ, aˆ.
Case 2: α1 + α2 ≥ 0. Here sˆ
∗ = min {aˆ, αˆ3}, where αˆ3 = φˆ (mˆ+ µM) /
(
ψˆ + y
L
)
.10
8 Since sˆ∗ = 0, we have bˆ = aˆ. Also, the money holdings in the next period of an agent that
chooses mˆ in the current period’s CM are given by mˆ+ µM .
9 In particular, Λˆ is the term we get if we lead Λ, defined in (2), by one period. Since Λ is
independent of m,a, Λˆ is independent of mˆ, aˆ.
10 As opposed to α3, the terms α1, α2 are constant. Moreover, from Lemma 1 it follows that
sˆ∗ = min {aˆ, αˆ3} is always an optimal choice in the forthcoming period, although not the only
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Following the same strategy as above, we write
V 3j(m, b, s) = U(X∗)−X∗ + φm+ (ψ +R)b+ (ψ + y
j
)s
+max
mˆ,aˆ
{
− φmˆ− ψaˆ+
β
2
[
V 2L(mˆ+ µM, aˆ−min {aˆ, αˆ3} ,min {aˆ, αˆ3})
+V 2H(mˆ+ µM, aˆ−min {aˆ, αˆ3} ,min {aˆ, αˆ3})
] }
=
= Ω1 +max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+ β
[
Λˆ + φˆmˆ+
(
R+ ψˆ
)
(aˆ−min {aˆ, αˆ3})
+
(
ψˆ +
y
H
+ y
L
2
)
min {aˆ, αˆ3}+
λ
2
(y
H
− y
L
) qˆ∗
]}
.
From (5), the quantity of s that changes hands in the DFM is given by
qˆ∗ = min
{
sˆ∗,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}
= min
{
min {aˆ, αˆ3} ,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}
=
= min
{
min
{
aˆ,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}
,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}
= min
{
aˆ,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}
.
Using this fact to rewrite the the value function V 3j, we conclude that the objective
of the agent is to
max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−
(
φ− βφˆ
)
mˆ−
[
ψ − β
(
R+ ψˆ
)]
aˆ
+
β
2
[(1 + λ)y
H
+ (1− λ)y
L
− 2R]min
{
aˆ,
φˆ (mˆ+ µM)
ψˆ + y
L
}}
≡
≡ max
mˆ,aˆ
{−γ1mˆ− γ2aˆ+ γ3min {aˆ, γ4mˆ+ γ5}} .
The definitions of the terms γi, i = 1, .., 5 is obvious and greatly simplifies the
notation. Notice that γ1, γ2 ≥ 0. Also, γ3 = β(α1 + α2) ≥ 0. Finally, γ4 > 0 and
the sign of γ5 depends on whether the monetary authority is running inflation or
deflation, i.e. the sign of µ. The objective function is linear in mˆ, aˆ. The optimal
solution depends on the magnitude of the various gamma’s. Considering that both
arguments in the min function depend on decision variables of the agent, the optimal
choice will have both arguments being equal to each other. Thus, it is relatively easy
one. This choice is the unique optimal, only if α1 + α2 > 0 and α1 < 0. Nevertheless, plugging
sˆ∗ = min {aˆ, αˆ3} into the value function V
3j is always a good idea, since it yields the same result as
any other sˆ∗.
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to verify that11
(mˆ∗, aˆ∗) =


(0, 0), if γ1 + γ2γ4 > γ3γ4,
(+∞,+∞), if γ1 + γ2γ4 < γ3γ4,
(z, γ4z + γ5), for any z ≥ −
γ5
γ4
, if γ1 + γ2γ4 = γ3γ4.
(11)
4 Equilibrium
We now proceed to the definition and the analysis of equilibrium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium for this economy is a set of value functions V ij, i =
1, 2, 3 and j = L,H that satisfy the Bellman equations, a triplet (p∗, q∗, s∗) that satisfy
(5), (6), and (9) in every period, and a pair of bounded sequences {φtMt}
∞
t=0,{ψt}
∞
t=0,
such that the agent behaves optimally under the conditions at = A and mt = Mt, all
t.
Consider first Case 1, i.e. α1 + α2 < 0. From (10), a necessary condition for
equilibrium is ψ = β
(
R+ ψˆ
)
, which implies that the sequence of the asset price
should follow the difference equation ψt+1 = −R + (1/β)ψt. Since β < 1, this can
only be true if
ψt = ψ¯ =
βR
1− β
. (12)
The asset price given by (12) is the fundamental value of the asset, i.e. the discounted
stream of future dividends. The result according to which ψt = ψ¯, reflects the fact
that in the case under consideration the asset is only valued for the fruit it yields:
agents never buy it in order to invest in the risky asset and possibly trade in the
DFM.
The role of money in this economy is not essential. Agents have a positive demand
for money only if φ = βφˆ. In steady state this implies that µ = 1−β, i.e the monetary
authority is following the Friedman rule.12 Agents carry money only when the cost
of doing so is zero (equivalently, when the nominal interest rate is zero). Of course,
they never get to use that money in the DFM, since s∗ = 0 and there is nothing to
trade money with.
The more interesting case is therefore α1 + α2 ≥ 0. For the rest of this paper
11 In the third line, the condition z ≥ −γ5/γ4 just guarantees that if µ < 0 the optimal choice of aˆ
satisfies non-negativity.
12 In steady state φM = φˆMˆ ⇒ φM = φˆ(1 + µ)M . Therefore, 1 + µ = φ/φˆ = β.
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we assume that this condition holds. Optimality (described by (11)) reveals that a
necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is
γ1 + γ2γ4 = γ3γ4 ⇔
φ− βφˆ+
[
ψ − β
(
R+ ψˆ
)]
φˆ
ψˆ+y
L
= β(α1 + α2)
φˆ
ψˆ+y
L
. (13)
As we pointed in the definition above, we focus on steady state equilibria. That is,
equilibria in which money balances and asset prices are constant in every period.
However, in the appendix we show that bubbles, i.e. equilibria in which the asset
price is above the market price for some periods, can never arise in this environment.
To simplify equation (13), divide both sides by φˆ and recall that at the steady
state φ/φˆ = 1 + µ. We obtain
(1 + µ− β)
(
ψˆ + y
L
)
= −ψ + β
(
R+ ψˆ
)
+ β(α1 + α2).
Using the definition of α1 + α2 and solving with respect to ψˆ yields the asset pricing
difference equation followed,
ψˆ =
β
2 [(1 + λ)yH + (1− λ)yL ]− (1 + µ− β)yL
1 + µ− 2β
−
1
1 + µ− 2β
ψ. (14)
As we explained, we drive our attention to the case in which ψ = ψˆ = ψ∗.13 Using
this in (14) and solving with respect to ψ∗ we obtain
ψ∗ =
β
2 [(1 + λ)yH + (1− λ)yL ]− (1 + µ− β)yL
2(1 − β) + µ
. (15)
It immediately follows from this equation that the price of the asset depends negatively
on the growth rate of money. This result is in contrast with the predictions of related
papers, like Geromichalos et al (2007) or Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2007). In
these papers agents bring money and real assets with them in the DFM in order to
buy a specialized good. Higher inflation makes carrying money more costly, and so
people turn to the relatively cheaper asset, thus increasing its price. Unlike these
papers, here money and the asset are complements, in the sense that agents need
both objects in order to trade in the DFM.14 If money is costly to carry, the demand
13 The returns y
H
and y
L
are deterministic and with probability 0.5. Therefore the only randomness
comes from the idiosyncratic realizations of those returns. The probability of going to the DFM, λ,
is also constant. Therefore, the intuition behind this is that the gain from decentralized trade is also
always going to be the same, so it makes sense that the price of the asset is constant every period as
well. More extensive discussion is provided later.
14 More precisely, agents trade m for s in the DFM, but in order to be in possession of some s,
agents need to bring some a from the previous period. To see why m and s are complements consider
the extreme case in which all agents bring a billion dollars but s∗ = 0. The surplus generated in the
DFM is still zero.
14
for the asset will decrease and so will its equilibrium price (given fixed supply).
A second observation that follows from (15) is that the price of the asset is always
higher than the fundamental value given by (12). In the Appendix we show that this
result is true as long as λ > 0. Moreover, since the asset price is decreasing in the
money growth rate, it obtains its maximum value when µ = β − 1. The resulting
expression is given by
ψmax =
β
1− β
1
2
[(1 + λ)y
H
+ (1− λ)y
L
] ≥
β
1− β
R,
where the inequality follows from the fact that α1 + α2 ≥ 0. Again, unless λ = 0,
the asset price is strictly greater than its fundamental value. Furthermore, since the
price, ψ∗, can never be smaller than βR/(1 − β) because this would violate Lemma
2, the upper bound of admissible monetary policies can be uniquely defined by µ¯ ≡
{µ : ψ∗(µ) = βR/(1 − β)}. A characterization of µ¯ is provided in the Appendix where
we also show that equilibria with positive inflation, µ¯ > 0, can be supported depending
on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
The asset pricing equation in this model reflects two dimensions. First, the asset
is valued for the dividend it yields, R. Second the asset is also valued for its property
to be transformed into s, thus allowing agents to generate additional value by re-
balancing their portfolios in the DFM. Since access to the DFM is granted with
probability λ, the difference expressed by ψ∗ − βR/(1 − β) reflects the premium of
the asset over the fundamental value. In particular, this premium is largest at the
Friedman rule, in which case the term α1 + α2 ≡ (1/2) [(1 + λ)yH + (1− λ)yL ] − R
would represent the spread. Notice, however, that in general such premium depends
on the money growth rate, µ. Then, we consider it appropriate to refer to it as
a liquidity premium. After all, additional value in this economy is generated by the
degree of “liquidity” in the DFM. That is, value is generated along with the easiness to
reallocate portfolios in the DFM, and this ultimately depends on the value of money.
4.1 Welfare
In most other related models welfare is measured in a standard manner by two terms:
the excess utility over the cost of producing the general consumption good in the cen-
tralized market, U(X)−X, and the excess utility of the total amount of consumption
in the decentralized market over the cost of producing that total amount. However, in
our economy there is no consumption good being traded in the decentralized market.
Instead, the amount of assets traded in the DFM affects the budget constraint in the
CM. Therefore, the way we measure welfare in this economy is by computing the total
value of trade in the DFM in terms of the CM.
Given that α1 + α2 > 0, in the IM agents place all their asset holdings into the
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risky investment, s∗ = A. In the DFM the amount of assets that change hands is
given by Q∗ = (λ/2)min {A,φM/(ψ + y
L
)} = (λ/2)A.15 This means that L-types sell
all their assets to H-types, which is efficient from a social point of view, and in return
they receive p∗Q∗ = λA(ψ∗ + y
L
)/(2φ∗). The latter accounts for the total value of
trade in the DFM. One result that is as stricking as important is that total welfare
is unaffected by inflation as long as µ ∈ [β − 1, µ¯]. This result implies, in contrast to
other monetary models, that welfare gains can be sustained even by positive rates of
inflation.16 If µ > µ¯ carrying money becomes too expensive and the monetary equi-
librium collapses, together with any trade in the DFM. A first best is achieved when
λ = 1 because decentralized trade (and, therefore, optimal re-alocation of resources)
is maximized. The following proposition summarizes the most important results.
Proposition 1. The key variable for the determination of equilibrium is α1 + α2,
which can be interpreted as the net return of the risky asset.
(a) If α1 + α2 ≤ 0 no trade exists in the DFM, q
∗ = s∗ = 0, and the asset is only
valued for the dividend it yields, i.e. ψ∗ = βR/(1− β). There is no essential role for
money in this economy. Its real allocation coincides with that of an Arrow-Debreu
economy and asset pricing follows the Lucas formula. A monetary equilibrium could
only be supported by the Friedman rule.
(b) If α1 + α2 > 0, ψt = ψ
∗(µ) given by (15) for all t. The range of policies under
which monetary equilibria can be supported is [β − 1, µ¯], where µ¯ is defined by µ¯ ≡
{µ : ψ∗(µ) = βR/(1 − β)}. For all µ in this range, dψ∗/dµ < 0. The bigger the λ,
the bigger the premium between the actual value and the fundamental value of the
asset. This liquidity premium is maximized at the Friedman rule. These results are
presented in Figure 3.
Equilibrium welfare depends on λ, i.e. the probability with which agents get to
trade in the DFM and re-balance their positions. In the DFM L-types sell all their
risky assets to H-types, hence all equilibria are (constrained) efficient. The First Best
is achieved when λ = 1.
If the decentralized financial market can generate value (α1+α2 > 0), then monetary
equilibria, φm > 0, exist and can be supported by monetary policies ranging from
the Friedman rule to potentially positive inflation rates. Risky investments take place
15 Remember that in any equilibrium with positive and finite money and asset holdings, these
variables are chosen so that the two arguments in the min function are the same.
16 This result is closely connected to the nature of the returns to the risky asset. In an alternative
specification of this model, we consider the case in which investing s ∈ [0, a] units of the asset yields
ǫjf(s), where j = L,H and f is a strictly increasing and concave function with standard Inada
conditions. Because lims→0f
′(s) = ∞, it is never optimal for the L-type to give up all her assets.
This creates a link between inflation and the amount of s that changes hands in the DFM. However,
the analysis becomes very complex and we are only able to solve the model numerically. Since none
of the major results of the model are altered, we prefer the more simple specification presented here,
which yields closed form solutions and clear intuition.
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even if their expected return is worse than that of safe investments. Agents access the
financial market to re-balance their portfolios so that investors with low returns sell
transfer all their security holdings, q∗ = s∗ = A, in exchange for p∗ units of money.
Thus, money plays an essential role as a medium of exchange in frictional financial
markets. In particular, the price at which securities are traded, p∗, not only is related
to the price of the real asset, but will also depend negatively on the money growth
rate, µ. The quantity exchanged, s∗, is independent of monetary considerations. More
interestingly, the price of the real asset, ψ∗ = ψ(µ), is always above its fundamental
value and exhibits a liquidity premium that depends crucially on two notions of liq-
uidity. On one side, the degree of access to decentralized financial markets, λ. And
on the other side, the degree of liquidity within the financial markets, which depends
on money supply, µ. The liquidity premium of the real asset, and therefore its value,
is maximized at the lowest feasible inflation rate. Positive money growth rate could
also generate welfare gains.
5 Conclusion
Certain types of markets have quickly developed to attain an enormous size within the
financial sector. They have also recently proven to have a considerable impact. Their
structure deviates from the standard centralization of primary markets that is embed-
ded in most macroeconomic models. Markets for securitization and Over-the-Counter
markets stand as a reference of these type of markets. In this context a concern arises
naturally: does monetary policy have something to say in these environments?
We have presented a general equilibrium model that analyzes the role of money
in decentralized financial markets. We provided an innovative framework that models
a risky financial asset that can be issued from the value of a safe-return real asset.
Agents can re-balance their positions on these relatively illiquid assets with a more
liquid instrument (fiat money) in a decentralized financial market. We show that value
can be generated from this transfer of assets, and therefore welfare can be increased,
by reallocating otherwise inefficient investment.
Our new approach yields very interesting results, some in contrast with the exist-
ing literature. On the one hand, monetary policy affects the price of the real and the
financial asset, attaining their maximum values at a policy equivalent to the Friedman
rule. In particular, since money and the real asset are complements, its price is nega-
tively correlated with inflation. On the other hand, monetary policy then influences
the value generated for the economy in the decentralized market. In fact, policy can
always sustain asset prices above their fundamental values and generate welfare gains
even under inflationary money growth rates, as long as those rates are not too large.
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A Appendix
Non-steady state equilibria.
We prove here that equilibria other than the steady state described above, cannot
arise in this model. More precisely, we cannot have sequences {φtMt}
∞
t=0,{ψt}
∞
t=0 that
converge to a certain limit either monotonically or in an oscillating manner. Therefore,
the only way to keep these sequences bounded is to have φtMt and ψt constant in all
periods (in order to make this statement one needs to exclude cycles, which is the
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case here). As part of an equilibrium, we are looking for bounded sequences of money
balances and asset prices such that (13) holds and also
φtMt = (ψt + yL)A, ∀t. (16)
Define real balances as z ≡ φM . If we multiply (13) by Mˆ and use (16) to substitute
for φˆ/(ψˆ+ y
L
) and ψ, we conclude that real money balances follow a first-order linear
difference equation,
zˆ = −
β (α1 + α2 +R) + (1− β)yL
2β
A+
2 + µ
2β
z.
However, µ ≥ β−1 always, which implies for the multiplier of z that (2+µ)/(2β) > 1.
Therefore, the sequence {φtMt}
∞
t=0 will always be explosive, unless (φM)t = (φM)
∗
for all t. Since (16) has to hold in every period the same conclusion is true for {ψt}
∞
t=0.
Optimal monetary policy range.
In the section on equilibrium with the price taking version we discussed the feasible
range for optimal monetary policies. Here we provide a more detailed characterization
of the upper bound of that range. The whole point of the price taking version is that it
supports asset prices higher than the fundamental value, and such price is decreasing
in the money growth rate. Therefore, the upper bound for monetary policy is the
money growth rate that makes the price of the real asset equal to its fundamental
value, µ¯ ≡ {µ : ψ∗(µ) = βR/(1 − β)}. If we take the equation for the equilibrium
price of the asset, (15), and make it equal to its fundamental value, we can solve for
the money growth rate, µ¯b. Thus, we write
ψ∗ =
β
2 [(1 + λ)yH + (1− λ)yL ]− (1− µ− β)yL
2(1 − β) + µ
=
βR
1− β
.
After some algebra one arrives at the following expression
µ¯b = β − 1 +
β(1 − β)(α
1
+ α
2
)
y
L
(1− β) + βR
.
which will be positive as long as α
1
+ α
2
> 1−ββ yL +R > 0.
Bargaining in the DFM.
We present here the complete analysis of the version of the model with bargaining in
the DFM. We consider agents bilaterally trading in this market according to a Nash
bargaining procedure. It can be easily shown that in any meeting between two agents
of the same type no trade will occur. Thus, we focus here on bilateral meetings of
agents of different type. In this matches the portfolio of a low type agent is (m, b, s)
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and that of a high type agents is (m¯, b¯, s¯). Thus, agents must choose the amount of
money, dm, and securities, ds, exchanged in order to
max
dm,ds
[
V 3L(m+ dm, b, s − ds)− V
3L(m, b, s)
]θ
×
×
[
V 3H(m¯− dm, b¯, s¯ + ds)− V
3H(m¯, b¯, s¯)
]1−θ
s.t. −m ≤ dm ≤ m¯; − s¯ ≤ ds ≤ s
In other words, agents maximize the value of trade. In principle, we formulate the
problem in the most general way that allows either agent to sell or buy securities.
However, in the equilibrium delivered by this version, in which returns on the risky
asset are linear in the amount of the asset, H-types will always be the buyers and
L-types the sellers. Now, using the linearity of the value function, we can rewrite the
bargaining problem as
max
dm,ds
[φdm − (ψ + yL)ds]
θ [−φdm + (ψ + yH )ds)]
1−θ (17)
s.t. −m ≤ dm ≤ m¯; − s¯ ≤ ds ≤ s
Before proceeding with any further analysis, it is absolutely critical to realize that the
problem we pose here is completely different from most other bargaining problems in
the mainstream literature on money search, at least in those models derived from LW.
The key aspect is the following. In those papers the welfare pie in the DFM is given
by u(q)− c(q), where q is the consumption of the good in that market, and u(q), c(q)
are the utility and cost derived from it. Whereas in our model the size of the pie is not
pre-determined. In fact, it depends on the size of the portfolio that the parties carry
with them. Therefore, the problem we propose here can only be solved by imposing
constraints, otherwise the agents would optimally choose dm = ds = +∞.
17 Thus,
the optimal solution to our problem features one of the constraints above binding in
equilibrium. We will proceed case by case and then summarize the results.
Suppose first that dm = m¯ and ds ≤ s. The problem has a unique interior
solution determined by the FOC for ds:
θ(ψ + y
L
)
φm¯− (ψ + y
L
)ds
=
(1− θ)(ψ + y
H
)
−φm¯+ (ψ + y
H
)ds
,
which yields
ds =
φm¯[ψ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
(ψ + y
L
)(ψ + y
H
)
≡ d∗s.
17 In all search models where consumption is traded in the DFM, its maximum level is bounded
above by the condition u′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
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To be more precise, ds = min{s, d
∗
s}. Now let us suppose that ds = s and dm ≤ m¯.
The first order condition for dm can be written as
θ[−φdm + (ψ + yH )s] = (1− θ)[φdm − (ψ + yL)s],
which implies that
dm =
s[ψ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
]
φ
≡ d∗m.
So, in fact, dm = min{m¯, d
∗
m}. In more detail, since there can be equilibria where
only one of the constraint binds or both bind, we have that if m¯ ≤ d∗m then dm = m¯.
In this case, ds = s only if s ≤ d
∗
s. In other words, both constraints would be binding
(dm = m¯, ds = s) in an equilibrium where m¯ ≤
s
φ [ψ + θyH + (1 − θ)yL ] ≡ mh and
m¯ ≥ sφ
(ψ+y
L
)(ψ+y
H
)
[ψ+(1−θ)y
H
+θy
L
] ≡ ml. It is easy to check that
ψ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
≥
(ψ + y
L
)(ψ + y
H
)
[ψ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
,
and this condition holds with strict inequality unless y
H
= y
L
, or θ = 0, or θ = 1; but
none of these happens in our model. Therefore, for all m¯ ∈ [ml,mh] agents exchange
dm = m¯ and ds = s. The cases where only one constraint binds are described by the
pairs (dm = m¯ < ml, ds = d
∗
s < s) and (mh = dm = d
∗
m < m¯, ds = s). That is, if
money holdings of the buyer are enough to purchase all s from the seller, then d∗m is
handed over in exchange for all s. Otherwise, the buyer will trade away all her money
in exchange for d∗s. All these possible cases are described by the solution below
dm = min
{
m¯,
s[ψ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
]
φ
}
,
(18)
ds = min
{
s,
φm¯[ψ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
(ψ + y
H
)(ψ + y
L
)
}
.
Once we know how the equilibrium in the DFM looks like, we can solve the rest of
the model proceeding as in the previous section. We use the solution to the DFM in
the optimization of the first market, and then we find the optimal solution for mˆ and
aˆ. We first have to find s so that
V 1(m,a) = max
s∈[0,a]
{
1
2
[
V 2L (m, b, s) + V 2H (m, b, s)
]}
. (19)
where now
V 2L (m, b, s) =
λ
2
V 3L
(
m+
∫
dm(m˜, s)dF (m˜), b, s −
∫
ds(m˜, s)dF (m˜)
)
+
(
1−
λ
2
)
V 3L (m, b, s) , (20)
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and
V 2H (m, b, s) =
λ
2
V 3H
(
m−
∫
dm(m, s˜)dG(s˜), b, s +
∫
ds(m, s˜)dG(s˜)
)
+
(
1−
λ
2
)
V 3H (m, b, s) . (21)
In the previous value functions, F (m˜) and G(s˜) are the distribution of money and
security holdings in the economy. Using the solution to the bargaining problem, (19)
can be written as
V 1(m,a) = maxs∈[0,a]
{
Λ + φm+ (ψ +R)a+
(
1
2yL +
1
2yH −R
)
s
+λφ4 min
{
m¯,
[ψ+θy
H
+(1−θ)y
L
]
φ s
}
− λφ4 min
{
m,
[ψ+θy
H
+(1−θ)y
L
]
φ s¯
}
+
λ(ψ+y
H
)
4 min
{
s¯,
φ[ψ+(1−θ)y
H
+θy
L
]
φ m
}
−
λ(ψ+y
L
)
4 min
{
s,
φ[ψ+(1−θ)y
H
+θy
L
]
φ m¯
}}
.
Remember that at this stage we have to choose s, so we are only interested in the 4th,
5th, and 8th terms. Therefore, focusing only on those terms and rearranging them a
little bit we can write the relevant objective function as
max
s∈[0,a]
{(
1
2
y
L
+
1
2
y
H
−R
)
s+
λ
4
[
[ψ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
]min
{
φm¯
ψ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
, s
}
−(ψ + y
L
)min
{
φ[ψ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
(ψ + y
H
)(ψ + y
L
)
m¯, s
}]}
.
or in short
max
s∈[0,a]
{(
1
2
y
L
+
1
2
y
H
−R
)
s+
λ
4
[
αb1min
{
αb2, s
}
− αb3min
{
αb4, s
}]}
,
where the definitions of αbi , i = 1, ..., 4, are obvious. It is easy to check that α
b
i ≥
0, αb1, α
b
2 > 0, and most importantly, α
b
1 ≥ α
b
3, α
b
4 > α
b
2. Now, let us recall that we are
focusing on the interesting case (1/2)(y
H
+ y
L
)−R ≤ 0. The following can easily be
verified by visual inspection after straightforward substitution. If we choose s ≤ αb2
the objective function above is strictly increasing in s as long as (λθ)/4(y
H
− y
L
) >
−[(1/2)(y
H
+ y
L
)−R]. On the other hand, if our choice was s ∈ [αb2, α
b
4] the objective
would become (λ/4)φm¯ + [(1/2)(y
H
+ y
L
) − R − (λ/4)(ψ + y
L
)]s, which is clearly
decresing in s. Finally, if s ≥ αb4 the objective would just be decreasing in s with all
but the first term being constant. In a word, the objective function is decreasing for
all s beyond αb2, which yields the following characterization of the solution
s∗ =


0, if 12(yH + yL) < R−
λθ(y
H
−y
L
)
4 ,
∈
[
0,min{αb2, a}
]
, if 12(yH + yL) = R−
λθ(y
H
−y
L
)
4 ,
min{αb2, a}, if
1
2(yH + yL) > R−
λθ(y
H
−y
L
)
4 .
(22)
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where αb2 =
φm¯
ψ+θy
H
+(1−θ)y
L
. As this solution describes, that the DFM actually opens,
s∗ > 0, depends on whether the expected return on the risky investment plus the
value generated by re-balancing portfolios with bargaining is high enough. If the ex-
pected return of securities is low, 12(yH + yL) ≤ R −
λθ(y
H
−y
L
)
4 , it is optimal to set
s∗ = 0 and no trade happens in the DFM. All we have to do then is solve for mˆ and
aˆ. In this case people store the safe asset only if its price is constant and behaves
according to ψ = β(R + ψˆ), that is ψ = βR/(1 − β). Obviously, in this equilibria
money is not essential and will only circulate as long as φ = βφˆ. On the other hand,
if the expected return on securities is good enough, 12(yH + yL) ≥ R−
λθ(y
H
−y
L
)
4 , then
s∗ = min{a, αb2} and we would proceed to solve for mˆ and aˆ using this choice of s.
Surprisingly enough, even though in this case there could be trade in the DFM, the
only equilibrium that can be supported again features the fundamental value of the
real asset, ψ = βR/(1− β).
Let us consider first the case of a bad distribution of returns, i.e., (1/2)(y
H
+y
L
) ≤
R− (λθ/4)(y
H
− y
L
). As we said, s∗ = 0 and we have to choose mˆ and aˆ to solve
V 3j(m, b, s) =
κ(m, b, s) + max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+ β
[
1
2
V 2L(mˆ+ µM, aˆ, 0) +
1
2
V 2H(mˆ+ µM, aˆ, 0)
]}
,
for j = H,L, where κ(m, b, s) is just a group of terms depending on previous choices
of money, real assets, and securities, but does not depend on the actual choice vari-
able. Also, remember that in the next period an amount µM of money is injected
(subtracted) in (from) the economy. The details of the rest of the computation are
available upon request. All that matters is that the optimal decision for next period
real asset holdings, aˆ, is given by
aˆ∗ =
{
0, if ψ > β(ψˆ +R),
∈ R+, if ψ = β(ψˆ +R),
(23)
and the optimal next period money holdings, mˆ, will only be positive under certain
parameterizations, when φ = βφˆ. In brief, if the distribution of returns on securities
is bad, people will optimally choose not to issue any risky assets. As a consequence,
there will be no trade in the DFM and money will only circulate under the Friedman
rule. The only feasible path for the asset price is then ψ = βR1−β .
Finally, let us consider the opposite case of a good enough distribution of returns,
(1/2)(y
H
+y
L
) ≥ R−(λθ/4)(y
H
−y
L
). In this scenario, we know that the best decision
on issuing risky assets is s∗ = min{a, αb2}. Using this to solve for mˆ and aˆ we can
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write
V 3j(m, b, s) = κ(m, b, s)
+max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−φmˆ− ψaˆ+ β
[
1
2
V 2L(mˆ+ µM, aˆ−min{aˆ, αˆb2},min{aˆ, αˆ
b
2})
+
1
2
V 2H(mˆ+ µM, aˆ−min{aˆ, αˆb2},min{aˆ, αˆ
b
2})
]}
,
for j = H,L, where αˆb2 =
φˆ( ˆ¯m+µM)
ψˆ+θy
H
+(1−θ)y
L
. If we are careful with the right expres-
sions for dm( ˆ¯m + µM,min{a, α
b
2}), dm(mˆ + µM, ˆ¯s), ds(mˆ + µM, ˆ¯s), and ds( ˆ¯m +
µM,min{a, αb2}), and after some algebra, we can arrive at a more useful objective
function
max
mˆ,aˆ
{
−(φ− βφˆ)mˆ− [ψ − β(ψˆ +R)]aˆ
+
[
1
2
(y
L
+ y
H
)−R+
λ
4
[ψˆ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
− (ψˆ + y
L
)]
]
min
{
aˆ,
φˆ( ˆ¯m+ µM)
ψˆ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
}
+
λφˆ
4
[ψˆ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
ψˆ + y
L
min
{
mˆ,
(ψˆ + y
H
)(ψˆ + y
L
)ˆ¯s
[ψˆ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]φˆ
− µM
}
λφˆ
4
min
{
mˆ,
[ψˆ + θy
H
+ (1− θ)y
L
]ˆ¯s
φˆ
− µM
}}
≡ max
mˆ
{−cm1 mˆ+ c
m
2 min{mˆ, c
m
3 } − c
m
4 min{mˆ, c
m
5 }}
+max
aˆ
{−ca1aˆ+ c
a
2 min{aˆ, c
a
3}},
where the definitions of cmi and c
a
k, i = 1, ..., 5, k = 1, 2, 3, are obvious. The optimal
solutions for mˆ and aˆ are fully described below
mˆ∗ =


0, if cm2 < c
m
1 + c
m
4 ,
∈ [0, cm3 ], if c
m
2 = c
m
1 + c
m
4 ,
cm3 , if c
m
2 > c
m
1 + c
m
4 ,
and aˆ∗ =


0, if ca2 < c
a
1,
ca3, if c
a
2 > c
a
1
∈ [0, ca3 ], if c
a
2 = c
a
1, c
a
1 6= 0,
∈ [ca3,+∞], if c
a
1 = 0.
(24)
However, it is important to notice that with this optimal decisions market clearing in
the DFM fails in the following sense. Within any given period the position of agents
on money, m, and the real asset, a, are optimally chosen in the previous period, having
taken into account the optimal choice for s this period. Thus, within any given period
we have s = min
{
a, αb2 =
φm
ψ+θy
H
+(1−θ)y
L
}
andm = cm3 =
(ψ+y
H
)(ψ+y
L
)s
[ψ+(1−θ)y
H
+θy
L
]φ , which are
24
clearly incompatible since we have shown that ψ+ θy
H
+(1− θ)y
L
>
(ψ+y
H
)(ψ+y
L
)
[ψ+(1−θ)y
H
+θy
L
] .
Therefore, the only possible equilibrium has ca1 = 0, ψ
∗ = βR1−β , mˆ
∗ = cm3 , and
aˆ∗ = A =
φˆ( ˆ¯m+ µM)[ψ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
(ψˆ + y
H
)(ψˆ + y
L
)
.
Finally, we characterize the range of monetary policies consistent with equilibria under
bargaining in the case of a good distribution of return. The optimal choice of money
balances requires that
λφˆ
4
[ψˆ + (1− θ)y
H
+ θy
L
]
(ψˆ + y
L
)
≥ φ− βφˆ+
λφˆ
4
.
Now, if we use the fact that the only possible path for the price of the asset is
ψ = βR/(1 − β) and rearrange the expression, we arrive at
µ ≤ β − 1 +
λ
4
(1− θ)(y
H
− y
L
)
βR
1−β + yL
= µ¯b, (25)
where we have used the fact that in a steady state φ = φˆ(1 + µ). We conclude that
there are many policies consistent with equilibrium, µ ∈ [β − 1, µ¯b]. However, none
of them affect asset prices, since ψ in this framework always reflects the fundamental
value of the asset.
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Figure 1: Securities Demand and Supply
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Figure 2: Optimal Choice of Securities
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Figure 3: Asset Price and Inflation
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